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IS THE REQUIRMENTS GENERATING SYSTEM GETTING THE 'NEEDED' RESOURCES TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS?

BACKGROUND
This is should not be the case. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation not only increased the authority of the JCS Chairman (while diluting that of the individual service chiefs), it was to give COCOMs a greater voice in decision making. 3 As a result of the legislation, the military services were to 'provide for the more efficient use of defense resources'. In other words, they were to ensure acquisition programs contribute to joint operations and interoperability (i.e. one service's communications equipment to interact with another service's).
The objective of this paper is to assess and discuss the process which provides COCOMs the equipment resources needed to accomplish their assigned missions; to include their role in determining the 'capabilities' a Service should obtain. This will be accomplished by discussing how services acquired assets pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act; what impact the Act had on the acquisition process; and how the process works today. Specifically, the paper will discuss what the Department of Defense (DoD) was not doing well, what DoD is doing well, and where DoD is going in the future. Finally, we will discuss whether or not we need to institute any changes to the system(s). Particularly, whether or not we need another Goldwater-Nichols type legislation or can change be handled from within the Department of Defense.
Because of the complexity and ever changing joint warfighting requirements process, this paper only addressed issues, policy, and actions prior to 1 January 2004.
PRE-GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, throughout the various stages of the resource acquisition process, the COCOMs (formally known as Commander's in Chief, or CINCs) did not fare well in influencing the process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff spent much time ensuring the COCOMs had equity in the process; however, most of the interactions/discussions were last minute…well after their initial funding decisions had been made. For years, the Service Chiefs dominated DoD's resource allocation process, focusing on their modernization and force structure needs. The Services were fulfilling their needs at the expense of the COCOM's "readiness and sustainability" warfighting priorities.
In the mid-80's, there was a conscious effort not to provide COCOMs additional manpower to develop, analyze, and track their integrated priority list requirements. The rationale at the time was that senior military leaders did not want the COCOMs to become weighed down by the bureaucratic collection requirements of congress and other agencies; they wanted the COCOMs to focus on their primary mission: warfighting. 4 With this decision, the COCOMs had to depend on the Services to tell them what happened in the aftermath of the budget process.
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
In 1986, Congress passed the Defense Reorganization Act, commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This law mandated jointness through structural reforms. The legislation had 8 objectives:
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• Reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority The overall assessment is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success in many areas. The 1991 Gulf War is a good example. Though falling short of true jointness in several key respects, the war did demonstrate that a more powerful JCS chairman and streamlined chain of command were vital to effective joint warfighting. 6 Jointness is now a common term and is becoming common practice within the services. However, several aspects of the 'new' joint system are coming under attack. Some complain the Pentagon's civilian leadership has been excessively weakened by Goldwater-Nichols, while the military has become too powerful;
violating the 'checks-and-balances' concept. 7 Whether this is true or, is beyond the scope of the present paper. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this paper is on one of the Goldwater-Nichols objectives we have not done so well on with the past 18 years: efficient use of defense resources.
THE RESOURCE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The resource acquisition process' goal is to provide combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. Goldwater-Nichols 12 If the Services do not adjust their POMs as a result of the review, the COCOMs can appeal to the SECDEF via issue papers. Ultimately, the SECDEF makes the final decision on resource acquisition.
The process has improved to some extent since 1986, but COCOMs still complain about not being able to adequately influence the process. Some of their concerns include: Services are too parochial, the acquisition process is too slow, and they (the COCOMs) don't have the time or staff to manage the process. The JROC assesses requirements for defense acquisition, assigns a joint priority among major programs and is expected to resolve cross-service requirements issues. 16 In recent years, JROC reviewed projects only at the end of the process. As a result, they
were not able to integrate the projects to realize joint warfighting capabilities. By the time the JROC got a chance to look at a system, it was already developed to the stage, that to make the system truly interoperable would be extremely expensive. 17 Requirements were Service rather than Joint focused. Systems were not necessarily integrated, duplication existed in smaller programs, and joint warfighting needs were not prioritized.
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The challenge facing the JROC was to find a way to maintain the Service's abilities to optimize the systems their forces employ in the domains in which they must operate, while at the same time having greater influence over the way the Services interact. 19 The challenge remains greatest in the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). COCOMs' high priority operational requirements, shortfalls, and specific concerns. 27 The
FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY BOARDS/JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TEAMS
Services are required to specifically address their support for the IPL requirement in their POMs, or explain whey they are not meeting the requirements.
Today, COCOMs can, and should be, an active player in the JROC Process (via the FCBs, JWCA, or the JROC itself). The challenge here is that, presently, the COCOMs aren't properly staffed to support the 'dedicated' time required by the FCB's continuous process. wants the services to spend their money on. The services then embark separately and accomplish their separate budgets (rarely coordinating with one another). When the Services come back to the table, the JROC evaluated the inputs to determine whether they believe it met the DPG, or whether or not they believed it was a joint requirement. The problem with this process is that if a COCOM, or anyone else wants to modify a requirement, it was too late in the process to significantly change anything. The caboose was unfortunately driving the train, not the engine. To this day, Service-centric requirements generation and the existing resource process cause continuous interoperability problems and create few 'born-joint' solutions.
WHAT DOD IS DOING WELL
A number of events occurred since 1986 which drove changes to the acquisition process.
In 2002, SECEF said the DoD requirement generating system did not provide what the COCOMs need…and the process was too slow. "We continue to buy things we do not need:
We need to fix it." 32 Around the same time, the Services requested a revision of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), a system of processes that produces documents that links strategy to resourcing and warfighting. 33 The Services wanted a more clearly defined linkage between the strategic planning and the National Military Strategy and programmatic decisions driven by the JROC process.
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In 2003, the CJCS acted and changed the process. Its' goal: seamless command and control; "born joint" systems, identification of legacy systems which require integration. 35 The emphasis is now on up-front guidance (through the Defense Planning Guidance/National
Military Strategy, etc…). The JROC obtains guidance and, in-turn, provide standards to the services to evaluate/validate future systems. 36 Then, again at the end of the process, the JROC validates each service's needs and compliance with joint capabilities. 37 This is accomplished through a new process called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 38 The new system institutes a capabilities-based approach to identifying current and future gaps in our ability to carry out joint warfighting missions and functions. 39 The JCIDS process will take time to mature. Until then, the JROC will continue to carefully analyze each service's system, determine whether or not it fits into the joint world, and approve it (if it meets certain criteria). The Services Vice Chairmen, who have the authority to say yes or no with regard to whether or not a system is going to be worth or be part of the joint fighting environment, do a relatively good job of validating requirements. 40 Instead of developing a perfect system, and then building the system to meet that vision of perfection, however long it takes or costs; the new approach is to start with the basics, roll out early models faster, and then add capabilities to the basic system as they come available. 41 Below are several FY04 joint and coalition, communications and intelligence acquisition examples highlight the uniqueness/difference of the "new" process:
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• $775 million for the transformation communications satellite (TSAT) which will provide the joint warfighter the unprecedented communications capability. Today, transmitting a Global Hawk image over a Milstar II satellite to the joint warfighter will take 12 minutes. The TSAT will decrease that time to less than 1 second.
• $600 million for the Joint Tactical Radio System, to provide a 'single system' which will provide communications and wireless internet capability to enable information exchange among the joint warfighters • $700 million for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems -a program that consolidates all the various unmanned combat air vehicle programs and focuses on developing a common operating system.
• $408 million to continue development of the Space Based Radar. The ability to monitor both fixed and mobile targets, deep behind enemy lines in any kind of weather.
• $4. . 43 The QDR outlines DoD's future goals: prepare for an uncertain future through a focused transformation effort, develop new operational concepts and organizations to exploit new technologies, and prepare against threats which would have large security implications. 44 To achieve these goals, SECDEF has two priorities: first to reshape the U.S. military from a heavy, industrial age force designed in the Cold War to an agile, information-age force capable of defeating more elusive adversaries anywhere on the globe. The second goal: is to reassert civilian control over the military.
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DoD will continue to modify/upgrade the way it acquires its warfighter capabilities.
Specifically, DoD will strive to improve its planning, budgeting, and interservice cooperation.
Additionally, DoD will continue to look towards outside organizations to identify other potential improvements.
PLANNING
The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), the overarching budget guidance, was distributed in fall 2003 (in draft form). In an unprecedented move, Pentagon officials met with the 4-star Regional/Combatant Commanders to discuss how to improve the SPG. 46 Earlier processes undercut the input of those commanders by given them a voice too late in the process. Commanders will continue to submit their IPLs, which itemize the COCOMs needs for a budget cycle, they will now be submitted to DoD early in the process, rather than the previous practice of issuing them at the last minute. 
INTER-SERVICE AND INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION
As we continue to improve our DoD system, we will not only focus on internal jointness, but will look to other Agencies (i.e. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), etc…) to ensure our systems/capabilities are compatible/interchangeable. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said it best: "As we look forward to the future challenges for the United States, it seems clear that more and more of the challenges that we will face will be faced not only by the military but by the other agencies of our government. We will need to be able to tie together the interagency process in Washington and somehow develop the kinds of trust among each other." 52 One example of trying to improve the internal DoD situation is the Deployable Joint Command and Control System. The Navy is the lead service developing this system. However, the Navy has special (stability of ships, salt air, etc…)...issues the other services, and even Agencies, don't have. An inter-agency area we need to improve on is to ensure our DoD system interact with systems of the other agencies.
For example, our DoD unmanned air vehicles, satellite systems, and tactical radio systems should be designed so they can easily interact with CIA, DIA and NSA systems.
OTHER EFFORTS
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a non-profit organization, is also assessing ways to reorganize DoD. • While the U.S. military is 'unparalleled in history'," the Defense Department remains highly resistant to change (finding)
• DoD is not adequately prepared for a number of 21 st Century missions (finding)
• DoD has a poor linkage of strategy and planning to budgeting (finding)
• DoD has inadequate attention to execution and accountability often surfaces (finding)
• COCOMs need a stronger role for combatant commanders in Pentagon decision-
The draft report goes on to say some problems outlined lie in basic organization. For instance, service secretaries continue to play a critical role, but the large, duplicative service secretariats are legacies from their WWII status as Cabinet Departments. 55 The report recommends merging secretariats and service staffs into a single, much smaller staff that would report to the SECDEF and service chief. 56 If this were to be implemented, the entire resource acquisition process would need to be overhauled.
DO WE NEED CHANGES/ADDITIONAL ACQUSITION REFORM?
As mentioned earlier, prior to 2003 there were a number of shortcomings in the existing resource acquisition process. The COCOMs felt they did not have an active voice in the process and their warfighting requirement needs were not being fulfilled by the Service secretaries or the JROC. Service parochialism determined what would be acquired. Weapon systems which would support the COCOMs were being purchased, but few true joint requirements were being created, causing the COCOMs interoperability challenges during operations. The process was also too bureaucratic. Even if a COCOM's requirement was valid and the Services supported it, the process was so slow and procedural; it was too late to make a change to the system. Finally, and probably most importantly, the acquisition had no real links to DoD planning guidance…the DPG.
With this said, DoD has been moving in the right direction to fix some of these challenges.
The recently implemented JCIDS process will help involve the COCOMs in the process earlier, push for more joint type systems, and hopefully decrease the acquisition process timeline.
However however the process owners really need to have 'continuity' throughout the entire acquisition process (which can be years).
What are the benefits of a more permanent panel? It would provide continuity to a process which is presently bureaucratic in nature. It allows the permanent members for focus on acquisition and not day-to-day contingency issues. The non-permanent members still would have a voice in decisions, but they could focus on military-specific issues…organize, train, and equip. (JCIDS) . JCIDS is DoD's new requirements generation system; designed to foster efficiency, flexibility, creativity and innovation in the acquisition process. 57 The JCIDS system is designed to enable organizations to define their capability needs while still focusing on national strategy.
CONCLUSION
Its' goal is to implement a capabilities-based approach to studying DoD requirements, and is designed to foster cooperation among Services, COCOMS, other government agencies, industry and academia.
Is the JCIDS process working? In past years, the COCOMs were able to determine the fate of only about $10 million to $400 million of the Pentagon's budget; however, for FY '06 the COCOMs were successful in receiving $10-$20 billion to support their warfighting requirements;
increasing from a scarce .09% of the DoD's budget to approximately 4%! 58 On paper, it seems the new JCIDS process is providing COCOMs with requirements they need. If this continues, then DoD may not require any Goldwater-Nichols type legislation. Any minor modifications can probably me made internal to the DoD. We have to be careful though. If history is any lesson, we will likely have to continue to adjust our processes to keep up with changes in the world around us. As U.S. policy or law changes, so shall DoD policies and processes.
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